Abstract. In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which consists of two parts: a pure-feedback-strategy part and an open-loop-control part. When the purefeedback-strategy part is zero or the open-loop-control part does not depend on the initial state, the mixed equilibrium solution reduces to the open-loop equilibrium control and the feedback equilibrium strategy, respectively. Using a maximum-principle-like methodology with forward-backward stochastic difference equations, a necessary and sufficient condition is established to characterize the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution. Then, by decoupling the forward-backward stochastic difference equations, three sets of difference equations, which together portray the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution, are obtained. Moreover, the case with a fixed time-state initial pair and the case with all the initial pairs are separately investigated. Furthermore, an example is constructed to show that the mixed equilibrium solution exists for all the initial pairs, although neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for some initial pairs.
1. Introduction. In this paper, we consider a class of mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problems. The system dynamics are described by the following discrete-time stochastic difference equation (S\Delta E):
\bigl(
A t,k X t k + \= A t,k \BbbE t X t k + B t,k u k + \= B t,k \BbbE t u k + f t,k \bigr)
\bigl( C i t,k \in \BbbR n are deterministic matrices, and \{ X t k , k \in \widetil \BbbT t \} \triangl X t and \{ u k , k \in \BbbT t \} \triangl u with \widetil \BbbT t = \{ t, 1, . . . , N \} are the state process and control process, respectively. The noise \{ w k , k \in \BbbT \} is assumed to be a vector-valued martingale difference sequence defined on a probability space (\Omega , \scrF , P ) with
Y.-H. NI, X. LI, J.-F. ZHANG, AND M. KRSTIC where \Delta k = (\delta ij k ) p\times p , k \in \BbbT , are assumed to be deterministic. \BbbE t [ \cdot ] in (1.1) denotes the conditional mathematical expectation \BbbE [ \cdot | \scrF t ], where \scrF t is defined as \sigma \{ w l , l = 0, 1, . . . , t -1\} and \scrF 0 is understood as \{ \emptyse , \Omega \} , and \BbbE k [ \cdot ] in (1.2) is similarly defined. x of (1.1) is in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ) = \{ \zeta \in \BbbR n | \zeta is \scrF t -measurable, \BbbE | \zeta | 2 < \infty \} . Replacing t, \BbbR n of l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ) with k, \BbbR n or \BbbR m , we then have l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR n ), l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR m ), k \in \BbbT . We introduce the cost function J(t, x; u) =
where Q t,k , \= Q t,k , R t,k , \= R t,k , k \in \BbbT t , G t , \= G t are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions, and q t,k , \rho t,k , k \in \BbbT t , g t are deterministic vectors. Let l 2 \scrF (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m ) = \bigl\{ \nu = \{ \nu k , k \in \BbbT t \} \bigm| \bigm| \nu k is \scrF k -measurable, \BbbE | \nu k | 2 < \infty , k \in \BbbT t \bigr\} .
Then, we pose the following optimal control problem.
Problem (LQ).
For the time-state initial pair (t, x), find u \ast \in l 2 \scrF (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m ) such that J(t, x; u \ast ) = inf obtain the results for the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy (with respect to a fixed initial pair). For the case with all the initial pairs, conditions in terms of solvability of three sets of difference equations are given to ensure the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution. These conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Interestingly, for all of the initial pairs, the existence of a general feedback equilibrium strategy is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which can be obtained by a backward procedure. Furthermore, the backward procedure works only when the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for all of the initial pairs and cannot be applied to the case where we know only of the existence of a feedback equilibrium strategy for a fixed initial pair. Section 4 gives an example to illustrate the developed theory. Finally, in section 5, we discuss future topics that are worth investigating. This paper presents the following new ideas. \bullet Most of the existing results for time-inconsistent LQ problems are for the continuous-time case [12, 13, 26, 27, 29, 31] . The discrete-time multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection problem is a notable example of Problem (LQ), and its investigation calls for the development of a general theory of discrete-time time-inconsistent LQ optimal control. Furthermore, the model and methodology developed in this paper are more general than those in [18] . \bullet The notion of a mixed equilibrium solution is introduced, and it seems that no similar notion has been reported for time-inconsistent optimal control. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established to characterize a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control as a mixed equilibrium solution (for a time-state initial pair). Using the notion of a mixed equilibrium solution, the conditions to equivalently ensure the existence of an open-loop equilibrium control and a linear feedback equilibrium strategy can be simultaneously obtained. In other words, we can investigate the two equilibrium solutions in a unified way. Importantly, the mixed equilibrium solution is not a hollow concept. In section 4, it is shown that neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for the initial pair (t, x) with t = 0, 1 and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR 2 ), although we are able to construct 10 mixed equilibrium solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to study the mixed equilibrium solution, which gives us more flexibility to deal with the time-inconsistent optimal control. The work of [19] serves as a companion to this paper in terms of testing our developed theory and pursuing the solvability of the multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection problem. The nondegenerate assumption was removed in [19] , which is popular in the literature on multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection. Neat conditions have been obtained in [19] to characterize the existence of the equilibrium solutions. To emphasize the dependence on the initial pair, Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x) is denoted as Problem (LQ) tx throughout this paper. Furthermore, for notational simplicity, we denote in this paper \scrA t,k = A t,k + \= A t,k , \scrB t,k = B t,k + \= B t,k , \scrC t,k , \scrQ t,k = Q t,k + \= Q t,k , \scrR t,k = R t,k + \= R t,k , \scrG t = G t + \= G t , t \in \BbbT , k \in \BbbT t .
Mixed equilibrium solution.
Before introducing the mixed equilibrium solution, we give the definitions of open-loop equilibrium control and feedback equiDownloaded 02/07/19 to 137.110.55.58. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php librium strategy. By a strategy, we mean a decision rule that a controller uses to select a control action based on the available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a mapping or an operator defined on the information set. Substituting the available information into a strategy, we obtain the open-loop value or realization of this strategy.
Definition 2.1. (i) At stage k \in \BbbT t , a function f k (\cdot ) is called an admissible feedback strategy (or simply a feedback strategy) at k if for \zeta \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR n ), f k (\zeta ) \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR m ). The set of this type of feedback strategies is denoted by \BbbF k , and \BbbF t \times \cdot \cdot \cdot \times \BbbF N - 1 is denoted by \BbbF \BbbT t .
(ii) Let f = (f t , . . . , f N - 1 ) \in \BbbF \BbbT t . For k \in \BbbT t and \zeta \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR n ), f k (\zeta ) can be divided into two parts, namely, f k (\zeta ) = f (a) \psi does not depend on x.
(b) For any k \in \BbbT t and any u k \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR m ), it holds that
In (2.1), (\psi \cdot X k,\psi )| \BbbT k and (\psi \cdot X k,u k ,\psi )| \BbbT k+1 (with \BbbT k = \{ k, . . . , N - 1\} , \BbbT k+1 = \{ k + 1, . . . , N -1\} ) are given by
where X k,\psi , X k,u k ,\psi are as follows: 
Furthermore, in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), X t,x,\ast k is computed via 
If \Psi and \gamma do not depend on x, and \psi of (i) is equal to (\Psi , \gamma ), namely, \psi k (\xi ) = \Psi k \xi + \gamma k , k \in \BbbT t , \xi \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR n ), then (\Psi , \gamma ) is called a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx .
holds for any k \in \BbbT t and any u k \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR m ). Here, u t,x | \BbbT k and u t,x | \BbbT k+1 are the restrictions of u t,x on \BbbT k and \BbbT k+1 , respectively; and X t,x,\ast k is computed via
is called a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx if the following two points hold:
(a) \Phi does not depend on x, and v t,x depends on x. (b) For any k \in \BbbT t and any u k \in l 2 \scrF (k; \BbbR m ), it holds that
In (2.5), (\Phi \cdot X k,\Phi +v t,x )| \BbbT k and (\Phi \cdot X k,u k ,\Phi +v t,x )| \BbbT k+1 are given, respectively, by 
(ii) \Phi and v t,x in (i) are, respectively, the pure-feedback-strategy part and the open-loop-control part of the mixed equilibrium solution (\Phi , v t,x ). (iii) Letting \Phi = 0 in (i), the corresponding v t,x satisfying (2.5), denoted as \widehat v t,x , is then an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) tx .
(iv) If v t,x of (i) happens not to depend on x and denote such v t,x as v, then the corresponding (\Phi , v) is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx .
Remark 2.5. By the definition, a mixed equilibrium solution (\Phi , v t,x ) is time consistent along X t,x,\ast , namely, for any k \in \BbbT t , (\Phi , v t,x )| \BbbT k is a mixed equilibrium solution for the initial pair (k, X t,x,\ast k
k and X k,\Phi of (\Phi \cdot X k,\Phi + v t,x )| \BbbT k with u k and X k,u k ,\Phi , respectively. Furthermore, note that the v t,x 's on both sides of (2.5) are the same. This is why we call \Phi the purefeedback-strategy part and v t,x the open-loop-control part.
3. Characterization of the mixed equilibrium solution.
3.1. The case with the fixed time-state initial pair (\bfitt , \bfitx ). The following lemma describes the cost difference formula under control perturbation.
\scrF (k; \BbbR m ) and \lambda \in \BbbR . Then, we have 
and the backward stochastic difference equation (BS\Delta E)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. The following statements are equivalent: (i) Problem (LQ) tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution.
(ii) There exists a pair (\Phi , v t,x ) \in l 2 (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m\times n ) \times l 2 \scrF (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m ) such that the stationary condition
and the convexity condition
hold. Here, Y 8) and \widetil
Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, (\Phi , v t,x ) given in (ii) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
Proof. This follows from the definition and Lemma 3.1.
To proceed, we first study the expression of Y k,\Phi of (3.8) under some additional condition.
k being deterministic, then the backward state Y k,\Phi of (3.8) has the following expression: 
Proof. See Appendix B.
For a matrix M \in \BbbR n\times m , let M \dagger be its Moore--Penrose inverse. Then, we have the following lemma [1] .
Lemma 3.4. Let matrices L, M , and N be given with appropriate size. Then, LXM = N has a solution X if and only if
where V is a matrix with appropriate size.
. Here, Ran(N ) is the range of N . The following theorem is concerned with the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution.
Theorem 3.5. The following statements are equivalent: (i) Problem (LQ) tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution.
(ii) There exists \Phi \in l 2 (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m\times n ) such that the following assertions hold. (a) The coupled equations Downloaded 02/07/19 to 137.110.55.58. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php
are solvable in the sense of \BbbO k \succeq 0, k \in \BbbT t , namely, \BbbO k , k \in \BbbT t , are all nonnegative definite.
is satisfied. Here, X t,x,\ast is computed via
and \scrO k , \scrL k , \theta k , k \in \BbbT t , are given by 
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.5, the solvability of (3.9) is to characterize the convexity (3.7), while (3.10) is to characterize the stationary condition (3.6). If \Phi \ell , \Gamma \ell , \ell \in \BbbT k+1 have been determined, then - \scrO \dagger k \scrL k can be further constructed. Noting (3.11), it is impossible to determine the value of \Phi k by using the property \Phi k + \Gamma k = - \scrO \dagger k \scrL k , and any (\Phi , v t,x ) that satisfies condition (ii) of Theorem 3.5 is a mixed equilibrium solution. Nevertheless, the freedom of selecting \Phi could enable us to deal with the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy in a unified way.
From Theorem 3.5, the following two corollaries are straightforward. The first concerns the open-loop equilibrium control, which is obtained by letting \Phi = 0 in Theorem 3.5. (ii) The following assertions hold.
(a) The coupled equations
are solvable in the sense of \widehat \BbbO k \succeq 0, k \in \BbbT t . Downloaded 02/07/19 to 137.110.55.58. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php
is satisfied. Here, \widehat X t,x,\ast is computed via
and \widehat \scrO k , \widehat \scrL k , \theta k , k \in \BbbT t , are given by 
is an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) tx .
Note that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy has nothing to do with the initial state x. The second corollary is concerned with the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which is obtained by letting \Gamma k = 0, k \in \BbbT t , in Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.8. The following statements are equivalent: (i) Problem (LQ) tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
(ii) The following assertions hold.
are solvable in the sense of \widetil
is satisfied. Here, \widetil X t,x,\ast is computed via
and \widetil \BbbL k , \widetil \theta k , k \in \BbbT t , are given by 
Mimicking the proof of Theorem 3.5 and based on Lemma 3.4, a control of the form
also satisfies (3.18) , where V k \in \BbbR m is deterministic and \widehat X t,x,\ast , \widehat \theta k are given by
with \widehat \pi k,k+1 computed via
Combining the solvability of (3. (c)\Rightar(a). It is obvious.
(ii) (d)\leftrig(e). Let (\Phi , v) be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . \widetil \BbbO k \succeq 0, k \in \BbbT k , follows from the solvability of (3.16). We now prove that \widetil \BbbO k , k \in \BbbT k , are all invertible. Note that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is independent of x. If some of \widetil \BbbO k , k \in \BbbT k , are singular, then similar to those of (a)\Rightar(b), v can be selected as any one of the following forms:
In (3.20), V k \in \BbbR m , k \in \BbbT t , are deterministic, and \widetil \theta k is given by
Therefore, Problem (LQ) tx admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy if and only if \widetil \BbbO k , k \in \BbbT k are all invertible, and thus are positive definite. (e)\Rightar(f) and (f)\Rightar(d) are obvious. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.10. Problem (LQ) tx admitting a unique open-loop equilibrium control is a local property, which is only of the unique existence for the fixed initial pair (t, x). Interestingly, this local property could ensure a semiglobal property, namely, for any k \in \BbbT t (after t) and any \xi \in l 
and \left\{ \left\{ \widehat \pi k,\ell = -\widehat \beta k,\ell \widehat \scrO
are solvable in the sense of
where 
Proof. (ii)\Rightar(i). From the solvability of (3.22) and (3.23), we know that (3.14) holds for any (t, x). Therefore, (i) holds.
(i)\Rightar(ii). Note that (3.14) is equivalent to \widehat \scrO k \widehat \scrO The following result is for the feedback equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 3.12. The following statements are equivalent: (i) For any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
(ii) The coupled equations \left\{ \left\{ \widetil
and \left\{ \left\{ \widetil \pi k,\ell = -\widetil \beta k,\ell \widetil \BbbO
are solvable in the sense of 
There exists a pair (\Phi , v) \in l 2 (\BbbT ; \BbbR m\times n ) \times l 2 \scrF (\BbbT ; \BbbR m ) such that for any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), (\Phi , v)| \BbbT t is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . Here, (\Phi , v)| \BbbT t is the restriction of (\Phi , v) on \BbbT t . (iv) There exists a \psi \in \BbbF \BbbT such that for any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), \psi | \BbbT t is a feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . Here, \psi | \BbbT t is the restriction of \psi on \BbbT t . Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, the pair (\Phi t , v t ) with \Phi t = \{ -\widetil \BbbO
Proof. See Appendix D.
We now consider the mixed equilibrium solution. If it exists, we have some freedom to select the pure-feedback-strategy part of the mixed equilibrium solution, as pointed out in Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.13, we have the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution for all of the initial pairs. Because different initial pairs may correspond to different pure-feedbackstrategy parts of the mixed equilibrium solution, the condition of Theorem 3.13 is for the case that specifies the pure-feedback-strategy part \Phi . Theorem 3.13. The following statements are equivalent: (i) For any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution and the pure-feedback-strategy part is \Phi | \BbbT t . Here, \Phi \in l 2 (\BbbT ; \BbbR m\times n ) and \Phi | \BbbT t is the restriction of \Phi on \BbbT t . (ii) There exists \Phi \in l 2 (\BbbT ; \BbbR m\times n ) such that the following difference equations 
are solvable in the sense of \BbbO k \succeq 0, \scrO k \scrO
and
For any t \in \BbbT and x \in l
Under condition (ii) and for any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), (\Phi | \BbbT t , v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
Proof. (ii)\Rightar(i). This follows from Theorem 3.5. (i)\Rightar(ii)
. In this case, for any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), the purefeedback-strategy part of the mixed equilibrium solution is \Phi | \BbbT t . Note that (3.10) is equivalent to \scrO k \scrO \dagger k (\scrL k X t,x,\ast k + \theta k ) = \scrL k X t,x,\ast k + \theta k , k \in \BbbT t . Letting k = t and taking different x \prime s, we have \scrO t \scrO \dagger t \scrL t = \scrL t , \scrO t \scrO \dagger t \theta t = \theta t . Therefore, (3.9), (3.27) , and (3.28) are solvable.
To end this section, we pose the following assumption.
The following result is straightforward.
Theorem 3.14. Letting (H) hold, then \widetil \BbbO k , k \in \BbbT , are all positive definite. Furthermore, for any t \in \BbbT and any x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a unique feedback equilibrium strategy (\Phi , v) with
Proof. A simple calculation shows that (3.24) is equal to
(3.29)
Due to (H), we have that \widetil S k,\ell , \widetil \scrS k,\ell \succeq 0, \widetil \BbbO k \succ 0, k \in \BbbT , \ell \in \BbbT k . Therefore, (3.24) and (3.25) are solvable. This completes the proof.
4. An example. Consider a discrete-time stochastic LQ problem, whose system dynamics and cost functional are given, respectively, by
and \{ w k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3\} is a martingale difference with constant second-order conditional moment \BbbE k (w , and based on Corollary 3.8 and Theorem 3.12, the feedback equilibrium strategy of this LQ problem must not exist.
Mixed equilibrium solution. We use the command``randn"" of MATLAB to randomly generate \Phi = \{ \Phi k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3\} . Note that \Phi k \in \BbbR 1\times 2 , \BbbO k , \scrO k \in \BbbR 1 , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and let
By performing the iterations (3.9), (3.27), (3.28), we select 10 \psi s and get the corresponding \BbbO s and \scrO s, For all 10 cases, \BbbO k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all positive, and \scrO k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all invertible. Then, due to Theorem 3.13, for any (t, x) with t \in \{ 0, 1, 2, 3\} and x \in l 2 \scrF (t; \BbbR 2 ), the above 10 cases correspond to 10 mixed equilibrium solutions of the considered LQ problem, which can be easily constructed from Theorem 3.13. For example, with the last \psi given above, the mixed equilibrium solution is as follows. Then, (\Phi , v 0,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution of this LQ problem for the initial pair (0, x), where \Phi = \{ \Phi k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3\} . Downloaded 02/07/19 to 137.110.55.58. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php 5. Summary. In this paper, the notion of a mixed equilibrium solution is introduced for the time-inconsistent discrete-time mean-field stochastic LQ optimal control. For a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control, necessary and sufficient conditions are given to ensure that such a pair is a mixed equilibrium solution. On this basis, the open-loop equilibrium control and feedback equivalent strategy can be dealt with in a unified way.
Although we provide some relevant results, the theory for mixed equilibrium solution is far from mature. From the example in section 4, we know that a remarkable property of the mixed equilibrium solution is its nonuniqueness. Thus, we propose that the following topics warrant further study:
(i) Characterize the set of all of the mixed equilibrium solutions of Problem (LQ).
(ii) Find the``best"" mixed equilibrium solution, which should be the one under which the equilibrium value function attains its extreme. (iii) As a test, the multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection must be thoroughly investigated. (iv) Finally, the analysis should be extended beyond the realm of the LQ controls and to a continuous-time setting.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.1. From (2.6) and (3.3), we have
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From (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that 
From (3.8), we have 
In the above, we apply the property \= v t,x \in l 2 (\BbbT t ; \BbbR m ). By deduction, we can get the desired result.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3.5.
(i)\Rightar(ii). Let (\Phi , v t,x ) be a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx , which satisfies (3.6) and (3.7) . By simple calculation, we have
which implies \BbbO k \succeq 0. Then, (3.9) is solvable. We now prove (b) and (c). Letting k = N -1 in (3.6) and noting
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Note that (\Phi , v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution and X t,x,\ast is given in (2.8). As
and for some \eta N - 1 \in \BbbR m ,
then the new pair (\Phi , v t,x ) with v 
Therefore, we have 
The following argument is similar to that between (C.4) and (C.8). Note that (\Phi , v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution and X t,x,\ast is given in (2.8). Because \Phi N - 2 X t,x,\ast
N - 2 satisfies (C.9), we have from Lemma 3.4 that (C.9) is equivalent to
and for some \eta N - 2 \in \BbbR m ,
or equivalently,
If we replace v
N - 2 of (\Phi , v t,x ) by (C.8) and
then the new pair (\Phi , v t,x ) is also a mixed equilibrium solution. By repeating the procedure between (C.2) and (C.11), we have the properties (b) and (c).
(ii)\Rightar(i). For k \in \BbbT , (C.1), and \BbbO k \succeq 0, we have we must have the solvability of (3.24)--(3.25). Furthermore, from the solvability of (3.24)--(3.25), it is not hard to confirm the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
(ii)\Rightar(iii) Let \Phi = \{ -\widetil \BbbO
Then, for any (t, x) with t \in \BbbT and x \in l 2 (t; \BbbR n ), (\Phi , v)| \BbbT t is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. (iii)\Rightar(iv). Let \psi = (\Phi , v). Then, this \psi satisfies the property of (iv). (iv)\Rightar(ii). We adopt a backward procedure to prove (ii). First, letting t = N -1, then (2.1) reads as from J(k, x; (u k , (\psi \cdot X k,u k ,\psi )| \BbbT k+1 )), we have 
